“Following the release of the Grenfell Tower Inquiry Phase 2 Report on 4 September 2024, Weightmans set out their views on where that leaves us in terms of fire safety / responses to cladding fires in an extensive review paper: The Grenfell Tower Inquiry Phase 2 Report. This article is based on the original article that appeared in that review paper.”

In the UK, the Grenfell Tower Inquiry has been a leading vehicle (if not the leading vehicle) by which the country’s response to the issues arising out of the tragic fire at Grenfell Tower has been assessed. The Inquiry has however taken seven years, has progressed in something of a disjointed manner from other reviews and other legislative changes, and even now at the final report stage, has only made ‘recommendations’ which we do not expect to result in palpable change for months (if not years) to come.

One of the issues the Grenfell Inquiry Phase 2 (and final) Report therefore causes us to consider is whether the Inquiry is (and indeed whether public inquiries generally are) a useful means by which change is driven. In part of reflecting on this, it is helpful to consider some of the different international responses to the use of combustible cladding in the construction industry.

UAE response

The United Arab Emirates has a large number of high-rise buildings and has encountered a high number of cladding-related fires, including a serious fire in a 336 metre high building in Dubai in 2012. Following this, the UAE amended its legislation to provide minimum requirements for cladding systems and fire stopping, leading to the introduction of the UAE Fire and Life Safety Code (“FLSC”) 2018. FLSC 2018 prohibits cladding assemblies for mid and high-rise buildings that are not fire-rated, and requires buildings over 15 metres in height to incorporate a fire-resistant spandrel panel. Cladding materials must also be tested with prescribed tests similar to those used in the UK, and cladding systems must be tested using a similar method to BS 8414.

The UAE also now utilises a “House of Expertise” made up of consultants who are experts in designing external walls and supervising façade contractors who review proposals for construction of new buildings. Further, FLSC 2018 demonstrates a change in approach to fire safety in acknowledging that “stay put” strategies require careful consideration, accepting that partial evacuation may be acceptable in high-rise buildings. 

This is a similar position to that in the UK’s National Fire Chiefs Council “Stay Put” Position Statement; whilst the Statement advises that tenants of flats in high-rise buildings should remain in their flats if there is a fire in another part of the building, it acknowledges that the advice is dependent on the circumstances.

Australia response

Whilst the Commonwealth of Australia is made up of states, the National Construction Code, (“NCC”), which sets the standards to be met by new buildings, is applied to the entire country.

Following a serious fire at the Lacrosse building in Melbourne, a number of reports were produced which investigated construction practices in Australia. One report by the Warren Centre highlighted that only two Australian state governments, Queensland and Tasmania, operated licensing schemes for fire engineers. Another, (report 5), recognised the skills that fire engineers are required to have and established the need to raise standards for those seeking to qualify as fire engineers. Engineers Australia (Australia’s national body for engineering), now bases its assessment for applicants for membership of the profession on the findings of report 5. Australia also introduced a new testing system to complement its existing materials combustibility test, AS 5113, which is almost identical to BS 8414.

Australia’s state of Victoria goes further to deter construction professionals from using sub-standard cladding materials on new buildings: Victoria’s Building Act makes it an indictable offence to knowingly carry out building work that is not compliant with the Act or its regulations. The offence carries a penalty of a maximum five-year prison sentence. Additionally, Victoria’s regulation of construction professionals allows the state to take disciplinary action against construction professionals where appropriate, and by September 2020 had done so in the case of 11 practitioners who had been involved in the installation of defective cladding. Conversely, the UK’s BSA 2022 provides that offenders may be prosecuted and imprisoned for up to two years.

The state of New South Wales has similarly introduced legislation to improve the safety of building materials: the Building Products (Safety) Act 2017 gives the Commissioner of Fair Trading powers to prohibit products which can reasonably be regarded as unsafe. In 2018, the Commissioner prohibited the use of ACM panels, (the same panels used on Grenfell Tower), with cores of more than 30% polyethylene on certain buildings. The UK has undertaken similar measures in preventing the use of combustible materials, (such as ACM panels), on buildings which exceed 18 metres in height.

Comment

There is some crossover between the measures that have been carried out by the jurisdictions mentioned in this article: they all now prescribe testing systems similar to BS 8414 and regulate the use of combustible materials on high-rise buildings. In some respects, however they appear to go further, and have notably got there without the need for a lengthy and very expensive public inquiry. This is perhaps particularly striking in the case of Australia, whose jurisdiction is comparable – and indeed derivative - of the UK’s

It is clear that, whilst the UK has made significant progress in making the construction industry safer by bringing in a number of new measures, it could still go further to deter construction professionals from making the same mistakes.

Now it is right to acknowledge that the issues uncovered by the Grenfell Tower Inquiry go beyond the regulation, manufacture and use of combustible façade materials in isolation: indeed perhaps the more striking concerns are the deep routed institutional problems highlighted which led to the position we are in. Comparing that across jurisdictions is a much more difficult task, and not one which can be undertaken in this article. It is also right to acknowledge that those most impacted by the tragedy needed answers and the Inquiry has (at least in part) been a way of achieving that.

It remains nonetheless interesting to reflect on how other jurisdictions have dealt with the same presenting issues and reached similar end points much more quickly. Given the number of yet to be remediated buildings, this surely must cause some reflection on how we address necessary industry-wide changes in the future. Whilst we sincerely hope there is never another Grenfell Tower, those in positions to bring about change would – we suggest – be wise to reflect that changes in the construction industry (and other industries are implemented in the future) and perhaps learn a lesson or two from elsewhere.